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TORT LIABILITY FOR PARENTS WHO CHOOSE NOT TO
VACCINATE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHOSE UNVACCINATED
CHILDREN INFECT OTHERS
Teri Dobbins Baxter∗

I. INTRODUCTION
In the past several years the United States has experienced outbreaks
of diseases that had been completely or nearly eliminated in past
decades.1 Among the diseases that have reappeared and sickened
hundreds of children are pertussis (also known as whooping cough) and
measles.2 In most cases the outbreaks have been traced to unvaccinated
individuals who contracted the diseases abroad in countries with higher
infection and lower immunization rates.3 While the source of an
outbreak may originate abroad, the spread of the diseases can usually be
traced to American children whose parents have chosen not to have
them immunized against these diseases.4 The unvaccinated children
have fallen sick and, in many cases, have infected other children who
were either too young to have received immunizations against the
disease or who contracted the disease despite having been immunized.5
There are many reasons why a parent may choose not to vaccinate her
child: fear that the vaccine causes autism or other illness; a desire to
avoid exposure to certain chemicals contained in a vaccine; allergies to
components of a vaccine; medical conditions that make immunization
inadvisable; religious prohibitions; belief that they are not necessary
because the diseases are no longer present in the United States or in their
community; or belief that children should build up their own immune
systems by being exposed to illness rather than protected from it. Some
of these reasons are based upon personal beliefs, but others are the result
∗ Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law, J.D., Duke University 1997,
B.A., Duke University 1993. The author thanks Katharine Sebald for her research assistance and the
Saint Louis University summer stipend that helped fund the research for this Article.
1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Measles–United States, 2011, 61 MMWR 253,
253–57 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6115a1.htm
[hereinafter CDC 61 MMWR].
2. Id; Amanda Schaffer, Why Are Babies Dying of Old-Fashioned Whooping Cough?
SLATE.COM (Sept. 5, 2012, 2:13 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2012/09/
why_babies_are_dying_of_whooping_cough_.html.
3. CDC 61 MMWR, supra note 1, at 253.
4. Schaffer, supra note 2.
5. A small percentage of people receiving vaccinations will not develop immunity to the
disease. Additionally, it takes time for many vaccinations to stimulate immunity; consequently, if a
person is exposed to a disease soon after receiving the vaccine, they may not have sufficient immunity
to fight off infection.
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of anti-vaccine campaigns based on widely discussed but completely
discredited reports linking autism to the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine
and vaccines that contained mercury.6 Although no studies have ever
confirmed either of those links and several have disproven any
connection, many vaccine opponents continue to assert that vaccines are
dangerous and those concerns are relayed to parents via the news media
and the internet.7
In the past, the number of parents who chose not to vaccinate their
children was very small.8 Because so many children were immunized,
what has been referred to as “herd immunity” protected even those who
were unable or unwilling to be immunized. However, because of the
reports linking vaccines to autism and other diseases,9 an increasing
number of parents are either refusing to immunize their children or are
delaying certain vaccines, resulting in longer periods of time during
which their children are susceptible to illness.10 While most children
still receive vaccines on the timeline recommended by the Center for
Disease Control and the American Pediatric Association, there are many
communities in which the number of unvaccinated children is high
enough to destroy herd immunity and increase the risk of outbreaks.11
Despite clear evidence of the safety and efficacy of vaccines, no state
has imposed an unequivocal duty on parents to immunize their children.
Although vaccines are generally required before a child can attend
public school, every state allows parents to opt out of this requirement
on various grounds.12 Since there is no duty to immunize, failure to
immunize is not a breach of any duty and no liability results, even if the
child later becomes sick or dies from a disease for which a
recommended vaccine exists. This result is consistent with the belief
that parents should have the final say with respect to medical decisions

6. Jay Winsten & Emily Serazin, Rolling Back the War on Vaccines, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Feb. 7, 2013, at A15, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732403950457
8260242982589914.html?KEYWORDS=rolling+back+the+war+on+vaccines#articleTabs%3Darticle.
7. Id. “An anxious parent who Googles ‘Are vaccines dangerous?’ will find four of the top five
results offering an emphatic ‘yes’—despite compelling evidence to the contrary. Such sources typically
are vocal opponents of current vaccine policies who have harnessed the power of the Internet.” Id.
8. See id.
9. PAUL OFFIT, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, CDC HEALTH INFORMATION FOR
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL 2012 YELLOW BOOK, PERSPECTIVES: FEAR OF VACCINES, at Ch. 2 (2012),
available
at
http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/yellowbook/2012/chapter-2-the-pre-travel-consultation/
perspectives-fear-of-vaccines.htm.
10. Id.
11. See Winsten & Serazin, supra note 6 (“In the U.S., 15 states had coverage rates for the MMR
vaccine below 90% in 2011, and only a handful had achieved 95%—the level required to protect infants
too young to receive the vaccine.”).
12. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Outbreak of Measles—San Diego, California,
January-February 2008, 57 MMWR 203, 203–06 (2008) [hereinafter CDC 57 MMWR].
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affecting their children unless imminent death or serious illness will
result from the denial of treatment. In the case of immunizations, no
such imminent threat exists unless there is an outbreak and the child
cannot be protected from exposure. Consequently, efforts to increase
immunization rates have focused on persuasion and not coercion. It is
understood that these efforts will not convince every parent that
vaccinations are safe and necessary. If the number of those who remain
unconvinced and whose children remain unvaccinated is high enough,
outbreaks will continue. Since infection is not limited to those who
choose not to be immunized (or whose parents choose not to have them
immunized), one question raised is whether parents whose unvaccinated
children become infected with vaccine-preventable diseases, and whose
unvaccinated children infect others, may be liable in tort for the injuries
of those their children have infected.13
Consider the following outbreak tracked by the Center for Disease
Control:
The index patient was an unvaccinated boy aged 7 years who had visited
Switzerland with his family, returning to the United States on January 13,
2008. He had fever and sore throat on January 21, followed by cough,
coryza, and conjunctivitis. On January 24, he attended school. On
January 25, the date of his rash onset, he visited the offices of his family
physician and his pediatrician. A diagnosis of scarlet fever was ruled out
on the basis of a negative rapid test for streptococcus. When the boy’s
condition became worse on January 26, he visited a children’s hospital
inpatient laboratory, where blood specimens were collected for measles
antibody testing; later that day, he was taken to the same hospital’s
emergency department because of high fever 104°F (40°C) and
generalized rash. No isolation precautions were instituted at the doctors’
offices or hospital facilities.
The boy’s measles immunoglobulin M (IgM) positive laboratory test
result was reported to the county health department on February 1, 2008.
During January 31–February 19, a total of 11 additional measles cases in
unvaccinated infants and children aged 10 months–9 years were
identified. These 11 cases included both of the index patient’s siblings
(rash onset: February 3), five children in his school (rash onset: January
31–February 17), and four additional children (rash onset: February 6–10)
who had been in the pediatrician’s office on January 25 at the same time
13. Many have debated and continue to debate whether immunizations should be mandatory
(without exemptions for religious or personal beliefs). This Article does not enter into that debate. Nor
does the Article consider whether parents can or should be charged with medical neglect or abuse if a
parent refuses to immunize his child and the child contracts a vaccine-preventable disease. Instead, this
Article considers only whether the parent can ever be civilly liable to others who are infected by the
parent’s unvaccinated child.
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as the index patient. Among these latter four patients, three were infants
aged <12 months. One of the three infants was hospitalized for 2 days for
dehydration; another infant traveled by airplane to Hawaii on February 9
while infectious.14

The outbreak described above affected only unvaccinated children and
infants too young to be immunized.15
The parents of the “index patient” presumably chose not to immunize
their child and then chose to travel with him to a country where measles
is still endemic.16 After he was infected and symptoms of measles were
present, he was taken or allowed to go to places where other vulnerable
children were present, and those children were then infected. Arguably,
these actions breached a duty of care that the parents owed to those
children, and those infected by the boy should be allowed to recover in
tort for their injuries. Given the rise of outbreaks and the potentially
devastating physical and financial toll that contracting a disease such as
measles or pertussis can take, it is inevitable that the courts will have to
face the question of whether liability should be imposed.
This issue has been debated by health care professionals and scholars,
but has received scant attention in the legal literature. Some public
health officials are concerned about damaging the trust and cooperation
between wary parents and the government that is necessary for strong
communities, while others believe that exposure to liability is the
consequence of making a decision that places the health and well-being
of others at risk. Legal scholars have contributed little to this debate.
This Article begins to fill that hole in the legal literature.17
Part II of this Article outlines the immunization requirements and
exemptions in California and Minnesota, states that have recently
experienced measles outbreaks. Part III identifies possible causes of
action that a victim of a vaccine-preventable illness might bring against
the person (or parents of a child) that infected him. Part IV discusses
the necessity of recognizing a duty in order for tort liability to exist and
examines factors courts will consider when determining whether to
recognize a duty in this context. Particular attention is paid to
constitutional concerns, including the Substantive Due Process rights
granted by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the
14. CDC 57 MMWR, supra note 12, at 203–04.
15. Id. at 204.
16. See id.
17. This Article takes no position regarding whether States should mandate vaccinations for all
citizens, eliminate exemptions allowed under current compulsory vaccination statutes, or whether
mandatory vaccination laws—without any exemptions—would violate the United States Constitution.
Instead, it assumes that parents are allowed to refuse to vaccinate their children and analyzes tort
liability in light of that refusal.
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Constitution, and privacy rights under various state constitutions.
Part V of this Article considers the nature and scope of the various
duties that courts might recognize and Part VI discusses how those
duties may be breached. Part VII addresses challenges associated with
establishing causation (proof that contact with a particular defendant
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s infection) and identifies recent
developments in science and technology that may help plaintiffs
overcome those challenges.
Finally, Part VIII discusses how
contributory negligence may diminish or prevent recovery by a plaintiff.
II. IMMUNIZATION REQUIREMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS
In order to understand why immunization rates have been historically
high and why rates can fall quickly, it is necessary to understand the
regulations in effect that “mandate” immunization and the exemptions
available to those opposed to immunization. “In the United States, all
states require children to be vaccinated in accordance with Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices recommendations before
attending school.”18 However, all states also allow medical exemptions,
and forty-eight states allow exemptions based on religious beliefs.19
Moreover, twenty-one states allow exemptions based on personal
beliefs.20 Because California and Minnesota have experienced recent
measles outbreaks, the regulations in those states will be examined and
used as examples.
A. California
In California, where one outbreak recently occurred, children must be
immunized against Poliomyelitis, Diphtheria, Pertussis, Tetanus,
Measles (Rubeola), Rubella, Haemophilus Influenzae Type B (Hib),
Mumps, and Hepatitis B.21 The Public Health regulations set out the
timeline for the vaccinations and children must receive the required
vaccines before they can be admitted22 to any public or private
18. CDC 57 MMWR, supra note 12, at 205.
19. Id.
20. Id. Each state defines the scope of the personal belief exemption differently. Id.
21. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. XVII, § 6020 (2013). The table of required vaccines and the timeline
for their administration is included at Appendix A. In 2011, the Public Health Code was amended to
require a dose of the Tdap vaccine to be given on or after the child’s seventh birthday. This requirement
was in effect from July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012. Id. § 6020 tbl. 1 n.8.
22. “‘Admission’ means a pupil’s first entry in a given public or private elementary or secondary
school, child care center, day nursery, nursery school, family day care home, or development center.
‘Admission’ also denotes a pupil’s re-entry to one of these institutions after withdrawing from a
previous enrollment.” Id. § 6000. Admission may be conditional or unconditional. Id. § 6000(a), (b).
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elementary or secondary school, child care center, day nursery, nursery
school, family day care home, or developmental center.23
Children who have not received the required immunizations may be
admitted if they have been granted a medical exemption or a “personal
belief” exemption.24 A medical exemption for one or more vaccines
will be granted upon presentation of a written statement from a licensed
physician stating that “the physical condition of the pupil or medical
circumstances relating to the pupil are such that immunization is
permanently not indicated.”25 The “personal belief” exemption is very
broad and only requires a statement by the parent or guardian of the
pupil “that such immunization is contrary to his or her beliefs.”26 The
statute does not limit the exemption to religious beliefs, but instead
would allow for an exemption based on (among others): a belief that
vaccines are unnecessary for diseases that have been eliminated in the
United States; belief that the government is conspiring with
pharmaceutical companies to maximize profits at the expense of
children’s health or safety; belief that vaccines cause autism or other
illnesses; belief that it is wrong to inject foreign substances into one’s
body; or belief that a child should not have to suffer the pain or
discomfort of vaccination. Moreover, there is no provision in the
regulations that would require, or even allow, inquiry into the
reasonableness or sincerity of the stated beliefs. Consequently, literally
every child in California is entitled to receive an exemption from the
immunization requirement if it is sought based on an alleged violation of
a personal belief.
Notwithstanding the exemption, the local health officer has the
authority to exclude a child from attending any school, child care center,
day nursery, nursery school, family day care home, or development
If admission is conditional, “[c]ontinued attendance after conditional admission is contingent upon
receipt of the remaining required immunizations . . . .” Id. § 6000(b).
23. Id. § 6020(a).
24. Id. § 6051.
25. Id. § 6051(a).
A physician may provide a written statement that the pupil is medically exempt from the measles
(rubeola) and/or varicella (chickenpox) requirements as a result of having had measles (rubeola)
and/or varicella (chickenpox) disease, respectively. A physician may provide a written
statement that the pupil is medically exempt from the rubella and/or mumps requirement as a
result of having had laboratory confirmed illness with the corresponding disease.
Id. Additionally, although not expressly stated, the wording of the statute would seem to authorize a
medical exemption if the physician stated that vaccines are not medically indicated because the child is
allergic to one of the vaccine components or the child has a medical condition that makes vaccination
inadvisable. See id.
26. See id. § 6051(b) (“A personal beliefs exemption shall be granted upon the filing with the
governing authority of a letter or affidavit from the pupil’s parent or guardian or adult who has assumed
responsibility for his or her care and custody in the case of a minor, or the person seeking admission if
an emancipated minor, that such immunization is contrary to his or her beliefs.”).
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center if there is “good cause to believe” that the child has been exposed
to a communicable disease against which the child has not been
completely immunized.27 If the health officer determines that the pupil
is at risk of developing the disease, the child may be excluded “until the
completion of the incubation period and the period of communicability
of the disease.”28
B. Minnesota
Minnesota also requires immunizations for children over the age of
two months who are enrolled in elementary or secondary school and
children enrolled in child care facilities.29 As in California, exemptions
are allowed if immunizations are contraindicated for medical reasons
and if the immunizations offend “the conscientiously held beliefs of the
parent or guardian of the minor child or of the emancipated person.”30
A child may also be granted an exemption from specific immunizations
based upon the age of the child, or if the child is enrolled in online
courses in which there is no contact with the instructor or other
students.31
27. Id. § 6060. The child may be exempt or may have been conditionally admitted despite
incomplete immunization. Id. § 6000(b) (“‘Conditional admission’ is admission based upon either
documentation of having received some but not all required immunizations and of not being due for any
vaccine dose at the time of entry or upon documentation of a temporary medical exemption to
immunization in accordance with Section 6050. Continued attendance after conditional admission is
contingent upon receipt of the remaining required immunizations in accordance with Sections 6020 and
6035.”).
28. Id. § 6060.
29. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.15(1) (2013);
Except as provided in subdivisions 3, 4, and 10, no person over two months old may be allowed
to enroll or remain enrolled in any elementary or secondary school or child care facility in this
state until the person has submitted to the administrator or other person having general control
and supervision of the school or child care facility, one of the following statements:
(1) a statement from a physician or a public clinic which provides immunizations stating
that the person has received immunization, consistent with medically acceptable
standards, against measles after having attained the age of 12 months, rubella, diphtheria,
tetanus, pertussis, polio, mumps, haemophilus influenza type b, and hepatitis B; or
(2) a statement from a physician or a public clinic which provides immunizations stating
that the person has received immunizations, consistent with medically acceptable
standards, against measles after having attained the age of 12 months, rubella, mumps,
and haemophilus influenza type b and that the person has commenced a schedule of
immunizations for diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, and hepatitis B and which
indicates the month and year of each immunization received.
Id.
30. Id. § 121A.15(3)(c)-(d). This exemption arguably requires that immunization offend a
sincere belief but that belief need not be reasonable. See id.
31. Id. § 121A.15(3);
Exemptions from immunizations.
(a) If a person is at least seven years old and has not been immunized against pertussis,
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C. Sources and Progression of Outbreaks
With respect to diseases such as measles which had been eliminated32
in the United States, outbreaks are almost always traced to people
travelling from other countries.33 In 2011, 222 measles cases were
reported to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).34
Ninety percent of those cases were “associated with importations from
other countries,” including fifty-two cases in U.S. residents returning
from abroad.35 Another twenty cases were linked to foreign visitors.36
Sixty-one percent were linked to importations epidemiologically, with
the person must not be required to be immunized against pertussis.
(b) If a person is at least 18 years old and has not completed a series of immunizations
against poliomyelitis, the person must not be required to be immunized against
poliomyelitis.
(c) If a statement, signed by a physician, is submitted to the administrator or other person
having general control and supervision of the school or child care facility stating that an
immunization is contraindicated for medical reasons or that laboratory confirmation of
the presence of adequate immunity exists, the immunization specified in the statement
need not be required.
(d) If a notarized statement signed by the minor child’s parent or guardian or by the
emancipated person is submitted to the administrator or other person having general
control and supervision of the school or child care facility stating that the person has not
been immunized as prescribed in subdivision 1 because of the conscientiously held
beliefs of the parent or guardian of the minor child or of the emancipated person, the
immunizations specified in the statement shall not be required. This statement must also
be forwarded to the commissioner of the Department of Health.
(e) If the person is under 15 months, the person is not required to be immunized against
measles, rubella, or mumps.
(f) If a person is at least five years old and has not been immunized against haemophilus
influenza type b, the person is not required to be immunized against haemophilus
influenza type b.
(g) If a person who is not a Minnesota resident enrolls in a Minnesota school online
learning course or program that delivers instruction to the person only by computer and
does not provide any teacher or instructor contact time or require classroom attendance,
the person is not subject to the immunization, statement, and other requirements of this
section.
Id.
32. CDC 61 MMWR, supra note 1, at 253 (defining “Measles elimination” as an “interruption of
year-round endemic measles transmission”).
33. Id.;
Occasionally, measles cases are reported without apparent links to importations, but virologic
evidence suggests recent importation of an undetected case or chain of cases. Given travel
patterns, the highly infectious nature of measles virus, and limitations of surveillance systems,
not every importation of measles virus into the United States is detected. Therefore, collection
of samples for virus detection is extremely important. Genetic characterization of viruses can
help to confirm or suggest the likely source of imported viruses because measles genotypes are
distributed heterogeneously in regions that have not yet eliminated measles.
Id. at 256.
34. Id. at 253. No deaths were reported. Id. at 254.
35. Id. at 253.
36. Id.
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virologic evidence suggesting recent importation, or linked to cases with
virologic evidence of recent importation.37 Eighty-six percent of the
measles patients were unvaccinated or their vaccination status was
unknown.38 “Cases are considered importations if exposure to measles
virus occurred outside the United States 7–21 days before rash onset and
rash occurred within twenty-one days of entry into the United States,
with no known exposure to measles in the United States during that
time.”39
Of the 222 measles cases, 196 were United States residents.40 One
hundred sixty-six of those U.S. residents were unvaccinated or had
unknown vaccination status.41 Of those who were unvaccinated, 141
were eligible for the measles vaccine, eighteen were too young to
receive the vaccine, and seven were presumed immune because of their
age or prior laboratory evidence indicating immunity to measles.42 Fifty
of the sixty-six patients between the ages of sixteen months and nineteen
years “had not been vaccinated because of a philosophic, religious, or
personal objection.”43
The CDC attributes increased importations to increased incidences of
measles in countries visited by U.S. travelers.44
Importation of measles virus into the United States will likely continue
and cause outbreaks in communities that have clusters of unvaccinated
persons. Maintenance of high MMR vaccination coverage is essential to
prevent measles outbreaks and sustain measles elimination in the United
States. Despite the relatively small number of reported cases in the
United States, the public and the health care providers must remain
vigilant. A drop in MMR vaccination coverage in a community can
increase the risk for large, sustained measles outbreaks, as experienced
recently in California and France, or reestablishment of endemic
transmission, as experienced in the United Kingdom.45

The CDC emphasized the role that health care providers play in
encouraging immunization of all eligible patients, in maintaining
awareness of measles, in immediately implementing isolation
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 254.
41. Id.
42. Id. Persons born before 1957 are presumed immune to measles. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 255. Almost half of the U.S. measles importations were traced back to the World
Health Organization European Region which documented more than 30,000 measles cases. Id. “Five
countries (France, Italy, Romania, Spain, and Germany) accounted for more than 90% of cases reported
to the European Centers for Disease Prevention and Control.” Id. at 255.
45. Id. at 256.
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procedures when symptoms of measles are present, and in reporting
suspected measles cases to local health departments.46
III. POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ACTION
If a parent chooses not to vaccinate her child and that child contracts a
contagious, vaccine-preventable disease, it is possible that the child
could infect others. This Part of the Article explores potential causes of
action for those infected by the unvaccinated child.47 Tort liability
would most likely be premised on claims of negligence or fraudulent
concealment. Under either theory, liability would exist regardless of
why the parent chose not to vaccinate the child.48
A. Fraudulent Concealment
The five elements of fraudulent concealment are: (1) the concealment of a
material existing fact that in equity and good conscience should be
disclosed; (2) knowledge on the part of the party against whom the claim
is asserted that such a fact is being concealed; (3) ignorance of that fact
on the part of the one from whom the fact is concealed; (4) the intention
that the concealment be acted upon; and (5) action on the concealment
resulting in damages.49

It is possible that courts would allow a claim for fraudulent
concealment of facts that led to infection of another. In the case of a
vaccine-preventable disease, this cause of action would only apply in
limited circumstances. The injured party must have relied upon the
intentionally concealed information regarding the defendant’s infection.
For example, a plaintiff could bring suit based upon alleged
representations by the defendant parent that her child was vaccinated or
had not been exposed to a vaccine-preventable illness, if the defendant
knew that those representations were false. A parent might make such a
false claim in order to enroll the child in school in a state that does not
allow for personal belief exemptions. If the unvaccinated child
transmits a vaccine-preventable illness to another child, the second child

46. Id.
47. In theory, an adult could be liable for transmitting a vaccine-preventable illness to another
person. However, since the trend against vaccination is relatively new and fewer adults failed to receive
the recommended vaccinations as children, there are fewer potential adult defendants liable because of
their own transmission of the disease, as opposed to transmission by their unvaccinated children.
48. Thus, if the child had an allergy to a particular vaccine or a medical condition that made
vaccination medically inadvisable, the parent would have the same duties as a parent who chose not to
vaccinate for fear that the vaccines cause or contribute to autism.
49. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Patterson, 263 P.3d 103, 109 (Colo. 2011) (quoting First Interstate
Bank of Fort Collins, N.A. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 744 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Colo.1987)).
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might be able to prove all of the elements of fraudulent concealment.
Likewise, if the parent of an unvaccinated child knows that the child has
been exposed to a vaccine-preventable disease and has begun showing
symptoms of that disease, and that parent nevertheless takes the child to
a day care where she will be in contact with other children, or adults
who care for vulnerable children, the parent might be liable on a
fraudulent concealment theory.
Such claims have been considered in cases involving sexually
transmitted diseases. Some courts have held that a person’s consent to
sexual intercourse may be ineffective if her sexual partner conceals the
risk of infection with a venereal disease.50 “The basic premise
underlying these old cases—consent to sexual intercourse vitiated by
one partner’s fraudulent concealment of the risk of infection with
venereal disease—is equally applicable today . . . .”51
While the nature of the concealed risk is obviously very different in
the case of transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases, the risks and
consequences are analogous. In each case, the infected person (or the
person’s parent) conceals information about a contagious disease from
someone who is vulnerable to contracting the disease. Moreover, in
each case, transmission could be prevented if the infected person (or
their parent) disclosed the infection or risk of transmission and allowed
others to avoid contact or association that could lead to infection.
B. Negligent Transmission of Contagious Disease
The more likely cause of action for someone who has been infected
by an unvaccinated child is negligence. “The essential elements of a
cause of action based on common law negligence may be stated briefly
as follows: the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff,
a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by that
breach.”52 In some jurisdictions, courts have found negligence in cases
in which one person contracts a contagious disease from another
person.53 In Doe v. Roe, the plaintiff and defendant were involved in a

50. Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 997 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (citing De Vall v.
Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206 (N.C. 1920); State v.
Lankford, 102 A. 63 (Del. 1917)).
51. Id.
52. Ward v. Kmart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140 (Ill. 1990); see also, e.g., Domagala v. Rolland,
805 N.W.2d 14, 22 (Minn. 2011) (“To recover for a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must prove (1) the
existence of a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) an injury, and (4) that the breach of the duty of
care was a proximate cause of the injury.”).
53. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1538, 1547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (finding defendant
liable for negligent transmission of genital herpes); C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 442–43 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989) (citing cases involving brucellosis, scarlet fever, and genital herpes).
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sexual relationship.54 Plaintiff contracted herpes from the defendant and
sued him, alleging negligence and fraud.55 The defendant was found
negligent for failing to “disclos[e] that he was infected with herpes or
taking precautions such as the use of a condom, to prevent its
transmission.”56
While transmission from an unvaccinated child does not involve the
same intimate contact as in cases of sexually transmitted diseases, the
same general negligence principles apply. If a parent fails to disclose
that her child is unvaccinated and at risk of contracting or transmitting a
vaccine-preventable disease and fails to take steps to avoid putting
others at risk of infection, that parent may be held to have breached a
duty to those that are infected by the unvaccinated child.57 However, the
public policy issues raised by unvaccinated children vary in important
respects from those raised by intimate contact between consenting
adults.
IV. RECOGNIZING A DUTY
Regardless of which tort theory is pursued, no liability can be
imposed absent a recognized duty of care.58 Whether such a duty exists
is a question of law and courts generally employ a balancing test to
determine whether a duty of care exists in a particular context.59
In determining whether a duty should be imposed, the courts are guided
by the basic principle . . . that everyone is responsible for injury
occasioned to another by his own want of ordinary care or skill.
Departures from this rule are warranted only by balancing a number of
policy considerations, including the foreseeability of the harm suffered,
the degree of certainty the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct and the consequences to
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care.60
54. Doe, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1542.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. It is important to emphasize that this Article does not consider whether parents can be liable
(to the state or to their children) simply for refusing to vaccinate their children. This Article argues only
that a failure to prevent the unvaccinated child from transmitting diseases to others can be a potential
breach of a duty of care.
58. Texas Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30, 33–34 (Tex. 2002) (“Whether a duty exists
is a question of law for the court.”) (citing Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523,
525 (Tex. 1990)); see also Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 919 (Tex. 1993); Otis Eng’g Corp. v. Clark,
668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983).
59. Doe, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1543.
60. Id. (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)) (internal
citation omitted). See also Texas Home Mgmt., 89 S.W.3d at 33 (“The question of legal duty is a
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A. Public Policy Considerations
This is by far the most complicated component. There are several
aspects of public policy that must be considered.
1. Alienating Concerned Parents
Some have argued that imposing liability on parents who refuse to
vaccinate their children will further alienate them from the medical
establishment and possibly further jeopardize their children’s health:
As a strategy to maintain high vaccination rates and preserve herd
immunity, talk of holding parents of unvaccinated children liable to those
whom they infect is woefully shortsighted. Putting aside the scientific
challenges of identifying with precision the specific source of an
infection, such a policy would only add to the antagonism between
supporters of vaccination and what, despite appearances to the contrary,
remains a small opposition movement.61

Instead of imposing liability, critics have suggested focusing on research
and education to emphasize the reasons why the vast majority of parents
justifiably support vaccination.62
While greater education and outreach may be useful, such efforts
have not had much success in some communities, particularly those who
believe that the government and pharmaceutical companies are
conspiring to cover-up the risks of vaccines. Moreover, in one recent
study researchers found that “[e]ven when they successfully refuted
claims about a link between vaccines and autism, they made parents
who were the most wary less inclined to inoculate their children.”63
In communities with a large number of parents refusing to vaccinate
their children, there is a greater risk of outbreak, which can endanger
those who are unable to receive vaccines due to age or medical
conditions. Notably, researchers at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of
multifaceted issue requiring us to balance a number of factors such as the risk and foreseeability of
injury, the social utility of the actor’s conduct, the consequences of imposing the burden on the actor,
and any other relevant competing individual and social interests implicated by the facts of the case.”);
Ward v. Kmart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140–41 (Ill. 1990) (“The ‘reasonable foreseeability’ of injury is
one important concern, but this court has recognized that foreseeability alone provides an inadequate
foundation upon which to base the existence of a legal duty. Other considerations include the likelihood
of injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it and the consequences of placing that
burden upon the defendant.”).
61. Jason L. Schwartz, Commentary, Unintended Consequences: The Primacy of Public Trust in
Vaccination, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 100, 103–04 (2009).
62. Id. at 104.
63. Jonel Aleccia, Pro-Vaccine Messages Actually Backfire, Study Finds, NBCNEWS.COM
(Mar. 3, 2014 12:31 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/pro-vaccine-messages-actuallybackfire-study-finds-n41611 (emphasis added).
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Public Health found that clusters of parents claiming personal belief
exemptions and clusters of pertussis cases in California “tended to be in
neighborhoods with higher levels of education and income.”64 If those
who refuse to vaccinate are more likely to be well educated, education
as a strategy for increasing vaccination rates seems unlikely to be
effective. Moreover, the threat of legal liability and financial harm may
be more effective if parents are financially able to pay a judgment
against them. Those who cannot protect themselves arguably should be
able to receive compensation from those who could protect themselves
(and thereby protect others) and who do not exercise due care to prevent
the spread of contagious diseases.
2. Liability as Infringement on Parents’ Federal Constitutional Rights
Some may argue that imposing liability on parents who choose not to
vaccinate their children infringes on their rights under the United States
Constitution.65 Addressing this argument requires consideration of the
various rights that have been recognized by the Supreme Court and the
effect that tort liability could have on those rights.
a. Substantive Due Process Rights
The Supreme Court has long recognized a right to personal liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.66 However,
that liberty is subject to reasonable regulation by the state when
necessary to promote the common good.67
State or municipal
regulations mandating immunizations have been upheld on this basis.68
In 1902, the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts passed a law requiring all
citizens to be vaccinated against smallpox.69 At the time the law was
passed, smallpox was prevalent in the city and the number of infected
persons was increasing.70 Mr. Jacobson was prosecuted and convicted
of violating the law by refusing to be vaccinated.71 Jacobson appealed
64. Nancy Shute, Vaccine Refusals Fueled California’s Whooping Cough Epidemic, NPR.ORG
(Sept. 30, 2013, 9:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/09/25/226147147/vaccine-refusalsfueled-californias-whooping-cough-epidemic.
65. Additional rights granted by state constitutions may be implicated and such concerns are
addressed infra Part IV.A.3.
66. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26–27 (1905).
67. Id. at 27.
68. Id.
69. Id. The vaccines were offered to Jacobson free of charge. Id. at 13.
70. Id. at 28.
71. Id. at 30. The defendant offered testimony and evidence of medical professionals who
claimed that the smallpox vaccine did not prevent the disease and caused other diseases. Id. The
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his conviction, claiming that the law violated his rights under the United
States Constitution, including his rights under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.72 He argued that compulsory vaccination
was “hostile to the inherent right of every freeman to care for his own
body and . . . nothing short of an assault upon his person.”73
The Court acknowledged the personal liberty rights granted by the
Constitution, but noted that personal liberty must be subject to
reasonable restraints necessary to protect the safety and health of the
general public.
There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the
supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any
human government, especially of any free government existing under a
written constitution, to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is
equally true that in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of
conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect
of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be
subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as
the safety of the general public may demand.74

The Court concluded that the regulation did not violate the Federal
Constitution and affirmed the judgment of the court below.75
The Court felt it necessary to note that if the state exercises its
authority in a way that is arbitrary or oppressive, the courts may
intervene.76 “It is easy, for instance, to suppose the case of an adult who
is embraced by the mere words of the act, but yet to subject whom to
vaccination in a particular condition of his health or body would be cruel
and inhuman to the last degree.”77 Under those circumstances the courts
would have authority to protect that individual,78 but the defendant in
Jacobson did not assert any such facts, nor was it established that the
statute would require vaccination on those facts.79
In addition to the personal liberty interest that allows adults to make
decisions regarding their own health and medical treatment, the

Supreme Court stated that it must assume that the legislature was aware of the conflicting opinions
regarding the efficacy of vaccination and chose to believe those who supported use of the vaccine as a
method of preventing spread of the disease. Id.
72. Id. at 26.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 29.
75. Id. at 38.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 39.
78. Id. Among the sources for parents’ rights is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
79. Id. (“It will always . . . be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language
which would avoid results of that character.”).
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Supreme Court has recognized that parents have broad discretion in the
upbringing of their children:
The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. More important,
historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents
to act in the best interests of their children.80

This includes making medical decisions affecting the child.81 Indeed,
the parent’s decision in this respect may even overrule the desires or
judgment of the child.82 “Most children, even in adolescence, simply
are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions,
including their need for medical care or treatment. Parents can and must
make those judgments.”83
While it is well established that parents have enforceable rights with
respect to raising their children, the scope of those rights is less clear. In
P.J. ex. rel. Jensen v. Wagner,84 P.J. (a minor), and his parents, the
Jensens, brought suit against various state actors alleging violation of
their substantive due process right to direct their child’s medical care
and their substantive due process right to familial association. They
further alleged that the state violated their procedural due process rights
by failing to conduct an independent investigation before filing for
custody of P.J. in juvenile court.85
P.J. had a growth removed from the floor of his mouth by an oral
surgeon.86 After pathology testing, P.J. was diagnosed with Ewing’s
sarcoma, a rare form of cancer.87 A second pathologist concurred in the
report.88
The Jensens then met with Dr. Wagner, a pediatric
oncologist.89 Dr. Wagner informed the Jensens that P.J.’s disease was
80. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). Obviously, some parents are guilty of neglect and
abuse. Id. (“As with so many other legal presumptions, experience and reality may rebut what the law
accepts as a starting point; the incidence of child neglect and abuse cases attests to this.”). But “[t]he
statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some
parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.” Id. at 603.
81. See PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1197 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e do not doubt
that a parent’s general right to make decisions concerning the care of her child includes, to some extent,
a more specific right to make decisions about the child’s medical care.”) (citing Dubbs v. Head Start,
Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003)).
82. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 620 (holding that allowing parents or guardians to commit children
to state mental hospitals without prior hearing does not violate the due process rights of the children).
83. Id. at 603.
84. Jensen, 603 F.3d at 1187, 1192.
85. Id. at 1192, 1200.
86. Id. at 1187.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1188.
89. Id.
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life-threatening and that Dr. Wagner believed chemotherapy was
required to save P.J.’s life.90 The Jensens requested an alternative
treatment but after conducting his own investigation, Dr. Wagner
informed them that he felt it was not a viable treatment option. At that
time he also informed them that he would have to report the case to
DCFS if he felt P.J.’s best medical interests were not being addressed.91
Eleven days later Dr. Wagner formally referred the case to DCFS, which
assigned Ms. Cunningham to the case.92
Ms. Cunningham, without conducting any further independent
investigation or contacting the Jensens, filed a Verified Petition and a
Motion to Transfer Custody and Guardianship in the Utah juvenile
court.93 After receiving notice of the verified petition, the Jensens had
further tissue testing done at a second hospital and received
confirmation of Ewing’s sarcoma and further recommendation for
chemotherapy.94 During the course of the subsequent hearings, the
Jensens contacted five other doctors for further testing and diagnosis.95
All either confirmed the diagnosis and recommended chemotherapy, or
were rejected by the court due to lack of board certification in pediatric
oncology.96 The court ordered that P.J. begin chemotherapy.97 P.J. was
never given chemotherapy, and the Jensens even took P.J. out of the
state against court orders; they were charged with misdemeanor
custodial interference and felony kidnapping.98
After resolution of the criminal charges, the state concluded that
forcing P.J. to undergo chemotherapy was no longer in the state’s
interest and the case was dismissed.99 The Jensens subsequently filed a
§ 1983 civil suit claiming violations of their substantive and procedural
due process rights.100 The District Court concluded that some of the
appellees were absolutely immune from suit, that the Jensens failed to
overcome the remaining defendants’ claims of qualified immunity, and
ultimately granted all five defendants summary judgment.101
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit first addressed the alleged violation of
the Jensens’ substantive due process right to direct P.J.’s medical
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1188–89.
Id. at 1189–90.
Id.
Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1190–91.
Id. at 1192.
Id.
Id.
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care.102 The district court had analyzed their right under the first prong
of the qualified immunity analysis and concluded that their rights were
not violated, but the Tenth Circuit considered whether any such right
was clearly established (the second requirement for overcoming a claim
of qualified immunity).103 The court stated that it did “not doubt that a
parent’s general right to make decisions concerning the care of her child
includes, to some extent, a more specific right to make decisions about
the child’s medical care.”104 However, “[t]he Supreme Court has long
recognized . . . that parental rights, including any right to direct a child’s
medical care, are not absolute.”105
The Tenth Circuit further stated that when a child’s life or health is
endangered by her parents’ decisions, the state may intervene in some
circumstances without violating the parents’ constitutional rights.106
[W]hen a child’s life is under immediate threat, a state’s interest in
protecting the child is at its zenith, and a state has broad authority to
intervene in parental decisionmaking that produces the threat to the
child’s life. . . . Here, the state was endowed with this broad authority,
and the Jensens do not direct us to a clearly established constitutional line
that defines what a state can and cannot do to protect a child whose life is
compromised by his parents’ refusal to obtain medical care. Certainly,
the Jensens do not assert any factual allegation that is substantially
supported in the record which would constitute state action that is clearly
outside the state’s “wide range of power.”107

Consequently, the Tenth Circuit held that whatever substantive due
process right the Jensens had to direct P.J.’s care, that right had not been
clearly established at the time the alleged violation occurred.108
The court next addressed the Jensens’ alleged substantive due process
right to familial association.109 In determining whether a plaintiff’s right
to familial association has been infringed, the court applies a balancing
test.110 “Under this test [the court] balance[s] the individual’s interest in
liberty against the State’s asserted reasons for restraining individual

102. Id. at 1197.
103. Id. “When a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the heavy burden of
establishing: (1) that the defendant’s actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2)
that the right violated was clearly established at the time of defendant’s actions.” Id. at 1196.
104. Id. “The Supreme Court has . . . alluded to, but never specifically defined the scope of a
parent’s right to direct her child’s medical care.” Id. at 1197.
105. Id. at 1197–98.
106. Id. at 1198.
107. Id. (citations omitted).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1199.
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liberty.”111 The court concluded that the record demonstrated that the
actual burden on the Jensens’ right to associate with P.J. was minimal.112
P.J. was never physically removed from the Jensens’ custody, and the
state afforded them many opportunities to obtain treatment before even
attempting to remove P.J. from their custody.113 The court concluded
that the Jensens failed to show that their associational rights were
violated.114
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, parents have wide latitude
in making decisions regarding their children, but that right may be
overridden by the state’s interest in protecting the health and well-being
of others. With respect to immunizations, the boundaries of parents’
substantive due process rights are especially blurry. In most cases, the
refusal to immunize does not pose any immediate or substantial threat to
their child’s health or the health of others. Thus, even in light of the
Supreme Court’s holding in Jacobson, it is doubtful that the state would
have the right to compel immunization when there is little or no risk that
the child will become infected with a disease or infect others.
Moreover, if the parent invokes a valid exemption to compulsory
immunization laws, the choice is presumptively valid and stateapproved.
Despite the protections of the Due Process clause, the Supreme
Court’s holding in Jacobson does support an inference that if an
outbreak of a vaccine-preventable disease occurs, or a specific and
significant risk is identified, states can mandate vaccination even in the
face of religious or personal belief objections.115 Allowing liability for
parents who choose not to vaccinate their children is even less likely to
fail on substantive due process grounds, primarily because liability is
not based solely on the decision not to vaccinate. The choice not to
vaccinate will result in liability only if—in addition to refusing to
vaccinate his children—a parent fails to exercise due care in a way that
harms others. Parents whose children do not contract vaccinepreventable diseases or who contract these diseases but do not infect
others will not face any liability.
b. First Amendment Free Exercise Clause
To the extent that the decision not to vaccinate is made for religious
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (the only exempt citizens were children who
had been certified by a physician as unfit for vaccination).
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reasons, parents are protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. Imposing liability might be seen as infringing on that
right. However, this argument is unconvincing for two reasons: first,
parents are not punished for acting in accordance with their religious
beliefs. The decision not to vaccinate a child has no negative legal
consequences unless, in addition, the parent fails to exercise due care
and that failure proximately causes harm to a third person. Second, the
right to practice one’s religion is not absolute. “The right to practice
religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the
child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”116
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases defining the right of parents
to direct the religious upbringing of their children is Prince v.
Massachusetts.117 In that case Sarah Prince appealed a conviction for
violating state child labor laws by “furnishing [a minor] with
magazines, knowing she was to sell them unlawfully . . . on the street,
and, as her custodian, permitting her to work contrary to law.”118 The
child, her niece Betty, had accompanied Mrs. Prince on several
occasions to a street corner where they sold religious literature to the
public as part of their religious practices as Jehovah’s Witnesses. Mrs.
Prince had previously been warned against doing so by a public
official.119 Appellant admitted to supplying Betty with the magazines
but claimed that enforcement of the law infringed upon Betty’s freedom
of religion under the First Amendment and further upon her parental
rights as custodian under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.120
In addressing Mrs. Prince’s rights as Betty’s guardian, the Court
acknowledged that parents have broad rights to provide their children
with religious education, and children are given freedom to exercise
their religion.121 However, the Court qualified its statement by noting
“the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and
authority in things affecting the child’s welfare; and that this includes, to
some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.”122 In the
case at bar, the Court concluded that the challenged regulation did not
116. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 159–60.
119. Id. at 161–62. Massachusetts’ child labor law stated in relevant part that, “[w]hoever
furnishes or sells to any minor any article . . . with the knowledge that the minor intends to sell such
article in violation of sections sixty-nine to seventy-three, inclusive, or after having received written
notice to this effect from any officer charged with the enforcement thereof, or knowingly procures or
encourages any minor to violate any provisions of said sections, shall be punished . . . .” Id. at 161.
120. Id. at 164.
121. Id. at 166.
122. Id. at 167.
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cross the boundary from reasonable exercise of power into a
constitutional violation.123
Although Prince did not concern medical decisions, the language in
that case has been relied upon by courts in cases involving parents who
refuse medical treatments for their children that violate their religious
beliefs.124 Moreover, while the Supreme Court has never directly ruled
on cases involving court-ordered treatment over the religious objections
of a parent, the Court has affirmed a district court ruling approving of
such orders.125 In Jehovah’s Witnesses in the State of Washington v.
King County Hospital Unit No. 1 (Harborview), the plaintiffs were
members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses religious group who sought a
permanent injunction to prevent state judges, juvenile court employees,
hospitals, hospital personnel, and all physicians in the State of
Washington from administering blood transfusions to Jehovah’s
Witnesses.126 Members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith oppose blood
transfusions on religious grounds, even when such transfusions are
deemed necessary to save the person’s life.127
The plaintiffs argued that the state statutes allowing judges to remove
children from their parents and declare the children wards of the state
for the purpose of permitting blood transfusions to be given to the
children over the objection of their parents were unconstitutional.128
Specifically, they claimed that the statutes “facilitate[d] state
impairment of plaintiffs’ religious freedom, contrary to the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and plaintiffs’ parental rights as guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”129
In rejecting these claims, the district court concluded that it was
123. Id. at 170.
124. See, e.g., Jehovah’s Witnesses in Washington v. King Cnty Hospital Unit No. 1, 390 U.S.
598 (1968) (per curiam), aff’d 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
125. Id. (one sentence opinion citing Prince).
126. Jehovah’s Witnesses of Washington v. King Cnty. Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 491 (W.D.
Wash. 1967).
127. Id.
Plaintiffs believe and accept as authoritative and binding upon them the
admonition of Almighty God Jehovah found in the Holy Bible commanding
Christians to ‘abstain from blood.’ Their belief places a positive religious duty on
the father in particular to provide for his children and to apply their religious
views, including abstinence from blood, in the family circle. In this connection, it
is the responsibility of the father to see that no member of his family receives a
blood transfusion, and no court or other official body can relieve him of that
responsibility. If a plaintiff receives a blood transfusion, this could, in the view of
the plaintiffs, mean permanent spiritual harm to both the child and parent or adult.
Id. at 502. The plaintiffs also submitted evidence that blood transfusions are risky, of limited
value, and never necessary. Id. at 503.
128. Id. at 503–04.
129. Id. at 504.
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bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Prince.130 While the district
court acknowledged that the Supreme Court did not intend for Prince to
“lay the foundation for every state intervention in the indoctrination and
participation of children in religion which may be done in the name of
their health and welfare,”131 the district court believed that Prince was
controlling in the case before it.132 “As stated in Prince, ‘The right to
practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose . . . the
child . . . to ill health or death.’”133
Refusing to vaccinate a child could be interpreted as exposing a child
to “ill health” if the child is likely to be exposed to the disease.
However, in most circumstances, the child is unlikely to suffer any
negative health consequences as a result of the parent refusing to have
the child vaccinated, at least with respect to those diseases which have
been mostly or completely eradicated in the area in which the child
resides. Assuming that the decision not to vaccinate has no immediate
(and perhaps, no long term) negative consequences, the language in
Prince and subsequent cases affirming parents’ right to make decisions
regarding the health and well-being of their children is more
appropriate:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder. . . . And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have
respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.134

While tort liability would not prohibit parents from refusing to
immunize their children (and, thus, would presumably not violate
parents’ First or Fourteenth Amendment rights), some might argue that
the potential for liability and the fear of liability imposes an
unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religion. This argument
is likely to fail because the potential for liability exists regardless of the
parents’ motivation for refusing to immunize.135 Thus, there is no law
that targets parents’ religious beliefs or practices. At most, it imposes a
duty of care on parents who choose not to vaccinate, regardless of the
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Jehovah’s Witnesses in Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (internal citations omitted)).
134. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. Moreover, any law that inhibits or restricts religious practices
“because of their religious motivation” is subject to strict scrutiny and is invalid unless it serves a
compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to that interest. Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
135. See Employment Div. Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Jim, 888 F.Supp. 1058 (D. Or. 1995).
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motivation. This is unlikely to be considered a substantial burden on the
free exercise of religion. Even if a court concludes that imposing a duty
of care on parents substantially burdens their constitutional rights,
protecting the health and well-being of citizens is a compelling interest.
Allowing (but not mandating) liability when parents fail to exercise due
care which results in harm to others, should satisfy even strict
scrutiny.136
3. Privacy Rights Granted by States
Many states recognize privacy rights under their state constitutions or
statutes.137 However, “[t]he right of privacy is not absolute, and in some
cases is subordinate to the state’s fundamental right to enact laws which
promote public health, welfare and safety, even though such laws may
invade the offender’s right of privacy.”138 These competing interests
could be implicated if parents are liable for negligent transmission of a
vaccine-preventable disease. While physicians are required to report
cases of measles, pertussis, and other contagious diseases to local health
authorities, the identities of patients is not disclosed to the general
public. If a victim/plaintiff is allowed to discover the identity of those
who have contracted a disease in order to identify a potential defendant,
that disclosure would represent a serious infringement on privacy rights
and likely a violation of medical privacy laws.139 However, if the
identity is obtained through other means (which may occur when a
person is infected by someone they know at school, day care, or in a
pediatrician’s office) a diagnosis may be confirmed through discovery
without violating a right of privacy.140
136. “[I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious
motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 533 (internal
citations omitted).
137. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized and
shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All
people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy.”); HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (“The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”); MONT.
CONST. art. 2, § 10 (“The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and
shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”).
138. See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 996 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
California courts have held that the right of privacy is subordinate in cases involving “forcible and
consensual sex acts, registration of convicted sex offenders,” statutes prohibiting spousal rape, and in
paternity cases. Id.
139. See, e.g., John B. v. Superior Court, 137 P.3d 153, 166–67 (Cal. 2006) (noting that the right
to privacy under the California Constitution protects medical records).
140. See id. at 169 (compelling discovery of defendant’s medical records in case alleging
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In John B. v. Superior Court, the plaintiff, Bridget, was the ex-wife of
the defendant, John. Shortly after their marriage, Bridget tested positive
for the HIV virus.141 John was then tested and was also diagnosed with
the HIV virus. Initially, Bridget believed that she had infected John, but
she later became convinced that John infected her.142 Her conclusion
was based, in part, on the speed with which John developed AIDS and
John’s admission that he had sexual encounters with men he met via the
internet before their marriage.143 Bridget filed suit against John
asserting several claims, including a claim for negligence.144 She
alleged that John owed her a duty to disclose his HIV positive status,
that he breached the duty by failing to disclose that fact, and his failure
led to him infecting her with HIV.145
During the discovery process, Bridget served John with
interrogatories and requests for admissions regarding his sexual and
medical history, to which he objected. She also subpoenaed his medical
records and John moved to quash the subpoenas. After hearings on the
discovery requests, the court overruled John’s objections and denied his
motions to quash.146 On appeal, John argued that the discovery requests
violated his right to privacy under the California Constitution.147 The
right of privacy had been held to include sexual relations and medical
records.148 In addition, California statutes protected the identity of a
person taking an HIV test.149 The California Supreme Court held that
John waived his rights under the statute because he accused Bridget of
infecting him and submitted evidence that he had previously tested
negative for HIV.150
With respect to his claims under the state constitution, the court
acknowledged John’s constitutional right to privacy, but held that this
right must be balanced against the right of a civil litigant to obtain
evidence relevant to their legal claims.151 Moreover, the court
considered the state’s compelling interest in preventing the spread of

negligent failure to warn that the defendant was HIV positive).
141. Id. at 155.
142. Id. at 155–56.
143. Id. at 156.
144. Id. Bridget also claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and fraud. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. The court appointed a discovery referee to hear the motions and the court adopted the
referee’s recommendations ruling in Bridget’s favor. Id.
147. Id. at 166–67.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 166.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 167.
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HIV and AIDS.152
In balancing these competing concerns, we note at the outset that this is
not a case in which a plaintiff seeks discovery to obtain information from
a defendant whose HIV status is unknown. Both parties have admitted
they are HIV positive, informally and in court filings. John thus has a
diminished privacy interest in his HIV status. . . . Moreover, not only
does the complaint allege sufficient facts to permit the inference that John
infected Bridget with HIV, but John has alleged that Bridget infected him.
By thus putting his own medical condition at issue, John has
“substantially lowered” his expectation of privacy even further.153

The court concluded that on those facts, the balance of interests favored
allowing Bridget to conduct discovery regarding John’s sexual history
and HIV status.154
While the court allowed discovery, it emphasized the limited extent of
discovery that would be permitted.155
In cases in which the
constitutional right of privacy is invaded during discovery, the court
must take care to narrowly tailor the ordered disclosure to the
allegations of the complaint in order to maintain a maximum level of
protection of the privacy interests.156 The court further noted that the
court had tools available—such as the right to order in camera review,
protective orders, and orders to seal—to protect the confidentiality of
materials produced.157 Finally, the court held that the physician–patient
privilege did not protect John’s medical records since the relevant
statute did not prevent compelled production of those records if the
party seeking production established “good cause” for disclosure.158
The superior court held that Bridget met this standard, and the California
Supreme Court found that the holding was not an abuse of the superior
court’s discretion.159

152. Id. (citing provisions of the Penal Code making it a felony to intentionally infect another with
HIV, and providing sentencing enhancement for certain crimes if the perpetrator knows he or she is HIV
positive).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 167–68 (“Thus, where a plaintiff seeks discovery from a defendant concerning sexual
matters protected by the constitutional right of privacy, the ‘intrusion upon sexual privacy may only be
done on the basis of ‘practical necessity.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Fults v. Superior
Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 899, 904–05 (1979)).
157. Id. at 169. The court had not been asked to rule on what measures would be appropriate in
that case and expressed no opinion in that regard. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. The superior court relied on Bridget’s evidence showing that her recent HIV positive
diagnosis, John’s HIV positive diagnosis, John’s relatively rapid progression to full-blown AIDS, and
the fact that “during the two years preceding Bridget’s diagnosis, she was dating John, engaged to him,
and married to him; and the couple engaged in unprotected sex during that period.” Id.
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In states which recognize a right to privacy in their constitution or
statutes, imposing liability for negligent transmission would implicate
some of the same privacy rights addressed in John B. However, it
would also raise the same compelling state interest in protecting the
health and safety of its citizens. Just as the California Supreme Court
had to balance the privacy interests of the defendant accused of
transmitting a disease against the right of the plaintiff to obtain
information relevant to the negligence claim, a court in a case alleging
negligent transmission of the vaccine-preventable disease would have to
balance the interests of both parties in light of the state’s interest in
preventing the spread of contagious diseases.
4. On Balance, Public Policy Favors Liability
Experts are justifiably concerned about the impact of allowing injured
persons to pursue claims against parents who fail to vaccinate their
children. As discussed above, parents have privacy rights protected by
the United States Constitution and various state laws, which grant them
broad discretion with respect to medical decisions concerning their
children. These rights are not absolute, but to the extent that parents
have no legal obligation to vaccinate their children, imposing liability
for the failure to do so arguably violates public policy. Courts could
also refuse to recognize a duty to avoid encouraging people to scapegoat
unvaccinated children for disease outbreaks. Instead of tracing infection
sources for medical and public health purposes, the searches could turn
into witch hunts or attempts to find a litigation target. Instead of
fostering cooperation it would become adversarial and perhaps even
dangerous for the families of unvaccinated children.
In the absence of countervailing considerations, these arguments
would likely carry the day. However, states have a responsibility to
protect the health and safety of their citizens, and to the extent that
imposing liability encourages parents to vaccinate their children or
zealously protect against infection of their unvaccinated children and
those with whom those children come in contact, public policy favors
imposing liability. Moreover, the very real financial burden that
accompanies illness for many in this country (both insured and
uninsured) weighs in favor of finding a duty. Those who find
themselves with thousands of dollars in medical bills due to an illness
contracted because of contact with an unvaccinated child are forced to
bear the cost of another parent’s decision. Allowing liability when the
illness is due to carelessness or recklessness simply places the financial
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burden on the shoulders of the morally responsible party.160 In any
event, it does not violate public policy because it does not infringe on a
parent’s right to make medical decisions for her child. Instead, it merely
imposes consequences when that decision, coupled with a lack of due
care, negatively affects the health of others.
B. Relationship Between the Parties
Negligence cases often distinguish between a general duty to exercise
ordinary care and a duty to act based upon a special relationship
between the parties.161 “Inaction by a defendant—such as a failure to
warn—constitutes negligence only when the defendant has a duty to act
for the protection of others.”162 A duty to act exists: (1) if the
defendant’s actions create a foreseeable risk of harm to others; or (2) if
the plaintiff and defendant have a special relationship and a third party
creates a foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff.163
While there is no general duty to control the acts of others, when
there is a “special relationship” between two parties, the law may
impose a duty on one to control the act of the other.164 “To reach the
conclusion that a special relationship exists, it must be assumed that the
harm to be prevented by the defendant is one that the defendant is in a
position to protect against and should be expected to protect against.”165
In the case of parents and children, a special relationship undoubtedly

160. It is notable that those who choose not to vaccinate are more likely to be well educated and
have above-average incomes. Shute, supra note 64.
161. Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 22–23 (Minn. 2011) (clarifying the distinction
between the specific duty to warn that arises when the parties stand in a special relationship and the duty
to warn that constitutes an exercise of the general duty of reasonable care).
162. Id. at 23.
163. Id. Courts have found special relationships on the part of “common carriers, innkeepers,
possessors of land who hold it open to the public, and persons who have custody of another person
under circumstances in which that other person is deprived of normal opportunities of self-protection.”
Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 1995). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (2012):
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or injured,
and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to members of the
public who enter in response to his invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under
circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection is under a
similar duty to the other.
164. Texas Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Tex. 2002).
165. Donaldson, 539 N.W.2d at 792.
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exists and in the context of transmission of vaccine-preventable
diseases, any tort duty will be that of the parent and not the child. In
other words, if the parent fails to exercise due care and allows the
unvaccinated child to transmit a disease to others, the parent may be
liable. The fact that the child is the one to transmit the disease does not
shift liability from the parent to the child.
In cases finding liability when one party infects the other with a
disease, the parties are often people who have been sexually intimate.166
In Doe v. Roe, the plaintiff contracted herpes from the defendant during
the course of their sexual relationship and the plaintiff sued the
defendant for negligence.167 The trial court found that the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty “to warn those with whom he is intimate of the
existence of his infectious condition or at least take precautions against
spreading it.”168 In John B. v. Superior Court, the plaintiff and
defendant were former spouses, each of whom accused the other of
infecting them with the HIV virus.169 The court held that a person who
knows or has reason to know that he or she is HIV positive can be liable
for negligent transmission of the virus.170 The court limited its holding
to the facts of the case: “a couple who were engaged and subsequently
married; a defendant who falsely represented himself as monogamous
and disease-free and insisted that the couple stop using condoms; and a
plaintiff who agreed to stop using condoms in reliance on those false
representations.”171 The court expressed no opinion regarding “the
existence or scope of a duty” for persons engaged in a casual or onetime sexual encounter, couples who are not monogamous, who have not
claimed to be free from disease, or who did not insist on using
condoms.172
In the context of a person infected by an unvaccinated child, the
relevant relationship is that between the parent of the unvaccinated child
and the person who contracts a vaccine-preventable illness from that
child.
The victim/plaintiff may have no relationship with the
unvaccinated child and the contact may be casual and brief, such as
when an unvaccinated child transmits the disease to another patient in
the physician’s waiting room. On the other hand, the children may be
classmates who are in close contact on a regular, even daily, basis. Even
166. See, e.g., Jane Doe v. Richard Roe, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1538, 1542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(negligence case between former sexual partners).
167. Id. at 1542.
168. Id. at 1544. The court assessed damages at $200,000 but reduced the award by twenty-five
percent because it found the plaintiff contributorily negligent. Id. at 1542–43.
169. John B. v. Superior Court, 137 P.3d 153, 155 (Cal. 2006).
170. Id. at 161.
171. Id. at 162–63.
172. Id. at 163.
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family members might find themselves on opposite sides of a case. A
court is unlikely to find a special relationship in any of these cases.
Consequently, any duty will be premised upon a finding that the parent’s
actions created a foreseeable risk of harm to others.
A parent’s choice not to immunize his or her children does not
usually, without more, create a foreseeable risk of harm. However,
there are circumstances that create a foreseeable risk of harm. For
example, if the parent takes the child to a country or an area in which
vaccine-preventable diseases are common, or if the child shows
symptoms of a contagious disease, and the parent takes the child to
places where he or she is in contact with others, those actions taken
together can give rise to a duty to warn, or otherwise act for the
protection of others. That duty might extend only to those with whom
the child came in contact or it might require disclosure to public health
officials who are better trained to assess the risk of transmission to
others and can be on alert for possible cases of infection.
C. Foreseeability of Harm
To determine whether the injury was foreseeable, courts look at the
defendant’s conduct and ask whether “it was objectively reasonable to
expect the specific danger causing the plaintiff’s injury.”173 In the case
of transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases, the issue is whether it is
objectively reasonable to expect transmission of a contagious disease in
light of the parent’s conduct. The answer to this question will require
consideration of more than the parent’s decision not to immunize a
child. The court will need to look at all of the parent’s actions that led
to the unvaccinated child contracting the disease and transmitting the
disease to the plaintiff. The court must consider whether the parent took
steps to protect the unvaccinated child from exposure to vaccinepreventable diseases, whether the parent was or should have been aware
of the methods by which such diseases are spread, whether the parent
realized or should have realized that the child was exhibiting symptoms
of a contagious disease, and any actions taken by the parent to avoid
spread of the disease to others.
In the case of a sexually transmitted disease, one court held the
defendant liable on a negligence theory when the defendant knew he had
herpes and knew that it could be transmitted to others through sexual
contact but did not warn his sexual partner about his infection or take
173. Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 27 (Minn. 2011). “To determine whether risk of
injury from the defendant’s conduct is foreseeable we ‘look at whether the specific danger was
objectively reasonable to expect, not simply whether it was within the realm of any conceivable
possibility.’” Id. at 26 (citing Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2009)).
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any precautions to prevent transmission to her.174 “Under these facts,
the record supports the court’s implied finding that the risk of harm was
foreseeable and that defendant unreasonably failed to exercise due care
to guard against this risk.”175 Thus, establishing foreseeability would be
easier if there is evidence that a parent knew that his unvaccinated child
had been exposed to a contagious disease and knowingly exposed the
child to others.
If the child is not showing symptoms of illness or if the symptoms
could be attributed to a non-contagious illness, it may be more difficult
to prove that a risk of harm was foreseeable. Ironically, it is the
effectiveness of vaccines which has made it easier for parents to
discount their importance.176 Due to the development and widespread
use of vaccines in the mid-twentieth century, many diseases for which
children are currently immunized have been virtually eliminated in the
United States. Thus, parents may not have ever heard of anyone
contracting the disease and may feel that immunizing their children is
unnecessary.177 Moreover, it may be completely unthinkable that their
child could infect others. Even parents who immunize their children
may believe that the risk of anyone (immunized or not) contracting
diseases which were nearly eradicated is very small.
However, it seems clear that parents cannot be willfully ignorant or
rely on beliefs that are contrary to all medical evidence. In Doe, the
court held that the defendant was negligent even though he did not
believe that he was placing the plaintiff at risk of contracting herpes.178
No one, much less a physician, told plaintiff that he could not transmit
herpes as long as he did not have lesions; defendant simply made up his
mind that such was the case.
Dr. Norman, whom defendant
consulted . . . testified
that . . . he
believed
that
asymptomatic
transmission was improbable, not impossible; moreover, [the defendant]
did not hear this as a medical opinion until after he was served with the
lawsuit. On the other hand, there was evidence at trial that the
phenomenon of asymptomatic transmission was not only known in the
medical community but reported in lay literature long before defendant
174. Jane Doe v. Richard Roe, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1538, 1538 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
175. Id. at 1545.
176. See Winsten & Serazin, supra note 6.
177. See id. This situation is analogous to a case finding that a person infected with the HIV virus
in the early 1980’s was not negligent for failing to warn his sexual partners that he was infected because
the virus was only recently discovered and the methods of infection and transmission were not well
understood at that time. C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 443–44 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (“Based on
the affidavits submitted by respondent’s physicians, and the information available to the general public
through the time the parties ended their sexual contact, it was not reasonable for respondent to have
constructive knowledge he might have AIDS, or that he was capable of transmitting the disease to
appellant.”).
178. Doe, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1545–46.
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commenced his affair with plaintiff. . . . Having discovered that he had a
venereal disease, defendant did nothing. He sought no information either
from his physicians or any other source about how to avoid transmitting
the disease or whether it was advisable to disclose its existence to those
with whom he had sexual relations.179

Similarly, courts may find that given the overwhelming evidence and
medical agreement that vaccines are necessary, safe, and effective, the
risk of harm to others is foreseeable in certain circumstances despite a
parent’s subjective belief that immunizations are dangerous or
unnecessary.
While foreseeability is generally a question of fact,180 in the context
of analyzing the existence or scope of a duty, foreseeability is a question
of law to be decided by the court.181 Moreover, the degree of
foreseeability varies based upon the facts of each case.182
The degree of foreseeability necessary to warrant the finding of a duty
will thus vary from case to case. For example, in cases where the burden
of preventing future harm is great, a high degree of foreseeability may be
required. On the other hand, in cases where there are strong policy
reasons for preventing the harm, or the harm can be prevented by simple
means, a lesser degree of foreseeability may be required.183

In the context of immunizations, there are strong policy reasons for
preventing the spread of contagious diseases. Moreover, the harm can
usually be prevented by simple means: immunization. Consequently, a
lesser degree of foreseeability may be required.184
Since immunizations are not strictly mandatory, parents who choose
not to immunize their children could argue that the burden of preventing
the harm is great. They must either abandon their strongly held beliefs
and immunize their children or go to great lengths to avoid situations in
which the unvaccinated child is likely to contract a disease or transmit it
to others. If the court accepts this argument, then it could hold that a
high degree of foreseeability is required.
Opponents may also argue that articles, and even celebrities, touting
the dangers of vaccines have been at least as well publicized as the
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993), disapproved of by Reid
v. Google, Inc., 235 P.3d 988 (Cal. 2010).
182. Gomez v. Ticor, 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 629 (Ct. App. 1983), abrogated by Sharon P. v.
Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d 121 (Cal. 1999) (internal citations omitted).
183. Id.
184. See Doe, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1544. In Doe, the court held that “it is beyond question that
our state’s policy of preventing the spread of venereal disease is great and that the burden of warning a
prospective sex partner is small. Thus, only a slight degree of foreseeability was needed to warrant the
imposition of a duty of due care in the present case.” Id.
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studies establishing their safety. In that context, it is likely that many
parents do not have access to information necessary to make an
informed choice. Thus, whether harm is foreseeable may depend, in
part, on the steps they took to educate themselves about the vaccines and
the risks and methods of transmitting vaccine-preventable diseases to
others.185
The CDC has stressed the significance of health care providers in
spreading the message about the importance of immunization.186 A
parent whose physician has educated the parent regarding the benefits of
vaccination and the low risk of a negative outcome, has explained that
alleged links between conditions such as autism and vaccines have been
disproved, and has explained the risks of infection without vaccination,
may be held to have foreseen the possibility of his child contracting a
disease and transmitting it to another. On the contrary, a parent who
either does not have access to such information (perhaps because his
medical provider does not believe in vaccinations and counseled against
them or who is from a country in which immunizations are not available
or required) may be less likely to be liable. Likewise, a parent who
intends to vaccinate but failed to follow the recommended schedule may
not be held to have foreseen the harm that would occur because of that
delay.
The potential for liability may increase as outbreaks increase in size
or frequency. If there has been an outbreak or incidence of a disease in
an area, and that incident has been publicized, and a parent takes her
unvaccinated child to the place or area where the disease has been
found, it is more likely that the harm will be foreseeable and the parent
is more likely to be found negligent if her child is infected and infects
someone else.
V. POTENTIAL DUTIES
Deciding that a duty exists addresses only part of the issue. Courts
must also decide the nature and scope of the duty. Options include: a
duty to vaccinate; a duty to avoid contact with vulnerable persons if the
unvaccinated child presents a risk to others; a duty to warn others that a
185. In Doe, the court faulted the defendant for failing to seek information from his doctors about
how to avoid transmitting herpes to others and whether he should inform his sexual partners that he was
infected. Id. at 1546. “Both experts at trial agreed that at the time in question it was sound medical
advice to inform a patient who has herpes to disclose such fact to any prospective sexual partner.” Id.
186. CDC 61 MMWR, supra note 1, at 257. “Health-care providers should encourage vaccination
of all eligible patients, including children and adults. . . . In addition, providers should remind their
patients who plan to travel internationally of the increased risk for measles and potential exposures
during bus, train, or air travel and at large international events or gatherings (e.g., Euro 2012 and the
2012 Summer Olympics) and the importance of vaccination.” Id.
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child is unvaccinated and has been or may have been exposed to a
vaccine-preventable illness; and a duty to be informed of the places
where vaccine-preventable illnesses are still present, how those diseases
are transmitted, how to identify symptoms of those illnesses in the
unvaccinated child, and how to protect the unvaccinated child and others
from transmission of disease.
A. Duty to Vaccinate
Currently, no state has imposed an absolute duty to vaccinate one’s
children. While all states have compulsory vaccination laws, all states
also have exemptions. Imposing a legal duty to vaccinate may seem
contrary to the states’ decisions and perhaps implicate preemption or
separation of powers concerns. A contingent duty may avoid these
obstacles. For instance, consistent with Jacobson, courts could find that
a duty to vaccinate exists if there has been a publicized outbreak of a
vaccine-preventable disease and the unvaccinated child is in regular
contact with others. An example would be a child who regularly attends
a playgroup or school, or frequents a playground where others are
present. This duty would apply to parents of children who had been
exempted from vaccination mandates based upon personal or religious
beliefs. Those who are exempt because of medical conditions would not
be liable for failure to vaccinate if vaccination would cause serious
physical harm, but they might have a duty to avoid contact with others
during the outbreak. A duty to vaccinate may also exist for people of all
ages who travel to countries where the diseases are still common or
where there is an outbreak.
B. Duty to Warn
If a parent chooses not to vaccinate his child, the courts could impose
a duty to warn others who may be vulnerable to the disease if it is
possible that the child is carrying the disease. An example would be a
parent whose unvaccinated child exhibits symptoms of a vaccinepreventable disease who then takes the child to the doctor’s office or
clinic or to some other place where vulnerable children may be present.
The parent could be required to contact medical personnel before
entering the office to notify them that the child is unvaccinated so that
quarantine or isolation procedures can be implemented. It might also
motivate the medical staff to test for diseases that they might not
otherwise expect to see.187
187. For example, a doctor who has not seen any cases of measles in the office in several years
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A parent might also be required to warn school officials if the
unvaccinated child has traveled to a country where vaccine-preventable
diseases are still common or if the child has come in contact with
foreign visitors from such a country, particularly if the child or visitors
have shown signs of illness. The court would have to decide whether
the duty is triggered merely by the possibility of exposure or if there
must be some evidence that the unvaccinated child poses a specific risk
to others.
C. Duty to Avoid Contact with Vulnerable Persons
This may include an obligation to know the symptoms of the vaccinepreventable diseases and a duty to avoid taking the child to places where
they are likely to come into contact with vulnerable persons if those
symptoms are present. A clear example would be the pediatrician’s
office. The pediatrician’s waiting room is likely to have children who
are sick—and therefore more vulnerable than healthy children whose
immune systems are not compromised—and children who are too young
to be fully or even partially vaccinated. Schools are also likely to
contain children who could not be vaccinated for medical reasons or
who did not develop immunity despite receiving vaccinations.
It is notable that even adults may be vulnerable if they were unable to
be vaccinated because of allergies to components of the vaccine or
because of other medical conditions. There is also a small percentage of
the vaccinated population that will remain susceptible to disease despite
vaccination. Since there is no way to know who falls into one of these
categories of vulnerable persons, an argument could be made that
parents have a duty to avoid contact with anyone if their unvaccinated
child has been exposed to a vaccine-preventable disease or is showing
symptoms of such a disease.
D. Duty to be Informed
This duty is a part of all of the above-referenced duties. A parent who
chooses not to immunize her child could be found to have a duty to learn
the symptoms of the vaccine-preventable diseases and take precautions
to avoid infecting others if the unvaccinated child develops symptoms of
those diseases. This duty may be fulfilled through consultation with the
child’s pediatrician or family practitioner. The parent may also contact
government agencies such as the CDC to track outbreaks of various
diseases as well as to obtain information about methods of transmission
might suspect the disease in an unvaccinated child even though it would not be suspected in a fully
immunized child.
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and early symptoms. The duty would likely require parents to consult
reasonably reliable sources of information.188
This duty may also require parents who choose not to vaccinate to be
more vigilant when their children are ill. Symptoms that might be
attributed to common colds or other minor illnesses may also be early
symptoms of serious vaccine-preventable illnesses.
Parents of
unvaccinated children need to be aware and perhaps be more willing to
keep their children away from others who exhibit these symptoms and,
if their children display those symptoms, keep the children away from
others who could be infected. This duty is clearest in places and at
times where an outbreak has occurred. Once a vaccine-preventable
disease has been diagnosed and publicized in a community, parents of
unvaccinated children may be held to have a duty to track the outbreak
and monitor their children’s potential contact with other infected
individuals.
VI. BREACH OF THE DUTY
Refusal to vaccinate would not be an automatic breach of any duty
except the duty to vaccinate (which, as discussed above, is unlikely to be
imposed by courts). Any other duty would only be breached by failure
to exercise reasonable care. What constitutes a breach will necessarily
depend upon the precise duty defined by the courts; but in all cases, the
plaintiff will have to establish that the defendant failed to take some
action that a reasonable person would have taken. Those who act
reasonably will not be liable.
For example, a court could find that parents have a duty to be
informed and to avoid contact with vulnerable persons if their
unvaccinated child shows symptoms of a contagious vaccinepreventable illness. Imagine a parent who is informed about the
symptoms of the diseases the vaccines prevent and the most likely ways
and places the child can contract the disease. The parent carefully
monitors his or her child’s health, avoids travel to countries where the
diseases are common, and pays attention to news reports of outbreaks to
avoid communities that are experiencing or have recently experienced
outbreaks. Unknown to the parent, the unvaccinated child has been
exposed to measles by the relative of a family friend who has recently
traveled abroad. Before the child shows any obvious signs of illness, the
188. A fact issue may often exist with respect to whether reliance upon particular sources was
reasonable. Internet searches are likely to direct the searcher to a fair number of vaccine-opponent sites
that may contain information that is contrary to the vast majority of the medical community. See
Winsten & Serazin, supra note 6. A parent who finds and relies on those sources may be held to have
breached their duty to be informed.
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parent takes the child to the pediatrician’s office for a routine check-up
where the child infects a six month old infant who is too young to have
received the measles vaccine. On these facts, a court could find as a
matter of law that the parent has not breached her duty of care.
VII. PROXIMATE CAUSE
Even if courts find that parents have a duty and that the duty is
breached in some way, a plaintiff will have to prove that her injury
(infection with a vaccine-preventable disease) was proximately caused
by that breach.189 Proving that a particular child transmitted a disease to
another and caused harm can be a difficult and, in some cases,
impossible task. It is this requirement, however, that ensures that
parents are not held liable (and thereby punished) simply for choosing
not to vaccinate their children. It is only when the choice not to
vaccinate results in harm to others that liability may be imposed.
Plaintiffs in cases involving transmission of vaccine-preventable
diseases will face several hurdles. The largest hurdle will be identifying
the proper defendant. One who is diagnosed with a disease may have no
idea when, how, or by whom they were infected. While it may be easy
to identify a potential defendant if a friend or close family member has
also been diagnosed with a disease, if there are no obvious sources the
potential plaintiff may not have access to the information necessary to
identify the person who infected her.
There may be potential plaintiffs who do have access to the
information necessary to establish causation. When a patient is
diagnosed with measles, pertussis, or one of many other vaccinepreventable diseases, doctors are required to notify local health officials.
Local officials are required to notify the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention.190 The CDC may take steps to track the spread of the
disease and to identify the various links in the chain of transmission.191
However, the purpose of this tracking is not to establish legal liability,
so it is unclear whether the conclusions of the CDC or public health
officials would be sufficient to prove proximate cause in a negligence
case. Additionally, privacy laws likely prevent the CDC, local health
officials, or personnel at the plaintiff’s doctor’s office from disclosing
189. Ward v. Kmart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140 (Ill. 1990) (“The essential elements of a cause of
action based on common law negligence may be stated briefly as follows: the existence of a duty owed
by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by that
breach.”).
190. CDC 61 MMWR, supra note 1, at 253.
191. For example, “[g]enetic characterization of the viruses can help to confirm or suggest the
likely source of imported viruses because measles genotypes are distributed heterogeneously in regions
that have not yet eliminated measles.” Id. at 256.
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the identity of people who have been diagnosed with the same illness or
who might have infected the plaintiff.192
While daunting, these hurdles are not insurmountable. Since
transmission requires close contact, the plaintiff may be able to narrow
down possible sources of infection and, with some deductive reasoning
(and perhaps, a lot of luck) a likely source can be identified. Discovery
requests can then be used to fill in some of the gaps. If the plaintiff can
identify the source of his infection (or suspected source) recent advances
in science and medicine may enable the plaintiff to establish causation
in ways that were unavailable even a few years ago.193
Perhaps as troubling as an inability to find a single contact that might
have led to infection, is the possibility of contact with several sources,
any of whom could have transmitted the virus. Because the initial
source of infection in a community is likely to have contact with several
people in that community, it may be difficult to determine who infected
whom. If the plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant is the one who
infected the plaintiff194 then the plaintiff may not be able to recover,
even if it is established that both carry the same strain of the bacteria or
virus or that their infection can be traced to a common source.
The plaintiff may also have to prove that intervening factors do not
sever the chain of liability. For example, with respect to pertussis, in
addition to unvaccinated children, it has been discovered that the
vaccine given in recent years does not last as long as previous versions
and may result in diminished immunity before the recommended booster
at age 13.195 The vaccine that has been given since the late 1990’s
(DTap) had fewer side effects than the prior version (DTP), but
researchers now suspect that it does not work for as long as the prior
version.196 Consequently, during an outbreak of pertussis in 2010, a
surprising number of victims were 7–10 year old kids who had received
all of the recommended DTap shots.197
A plaintiff who contracted pertussis from an unvaccinated child might
192. See, e.g., John B. v. Superior Court, 137 P.3d 153, 166, 169 (Cal. 2006).
193. See, e.g., How Scientists Stopped Superbug that Killed 6 by Using DNA to Track Its Source,
CBS NEWS (Aug. 22, 2012, 4:51 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504763_162-5749849010391704/how-scientists-stopped-superbug-that-killed-6-by-using-dna-to-track-its-source/ (describing
DNA sequencing of drug resistant Klebsiella pneumonia bacteria that allowed NIH researchers to track
the source of an outbreak at a leading research hospital); Former Mayo Clinic Radiology Tech sentenced
to 30 years for infecting 5 people with Hepatitis C, FIRSTCOASTNEWS.COM (Sept. 10, 2012, 11:28 PM),
http://www.firstcoastnews.com/topstories/article/272911/483/Man-sentenced-to-30-years-for-infectingfive-people-with-Hepatitis-C (noting that medical advances led to the source of patient’s Hepatitis C
infection).
194. The standard of proof in civil cases is a preponderance of the evidence.
195. See Schaffer, supra note 2.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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have difficulty proving that contact with the unvaccinated child was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s infection. Depending on the age of the
unvaccinated child, the defendant could argue that even if the child had
been immunized, the child might have contracted pertussis due to the
diminishing effectiveness of the DTap shot. Causation will be
especially difficult to establish in the wake of a pertussis outbreak since
so many people who received the DTap vaccine may be vulnerable to
the virus, thus enabling it to spread quickly through communities, even
if only a few are unvaccinated.
Acts of third parties may also intervene. In some cases, patients in
physician waiting rooms have contracted contagious diseases from other
patients. If the physician or the physician’s staff was aware that an
unvaccinated child was exhibiting symptoms that could indicate a
contagious disease and failed to notify the parent of that possibility or
isolate the child from other patients, that physician’s actions could be a
superseding cause of the second patient’s infection.
VIII. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Liability may be reduced or eliminated if the plaintiff is guilty of
contributory negligence. For example, a plaintiff who chose not to be
vaccinated because of personal beliefs or simple inattention may not be
able to recover if the jury or judge finds that the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s infection was (in whole or in part) the plaintiff’s own actions.
Likewise, if the plaintiff could not be vaccinated because of a medical
condition or if the plaintiff is otherwise aware that she has no immunity
to certain diseases, that plaintiff must take precautions to avoid
situations in which he or she is likely to come in contact with the
disease. If, for example, the plaintiff knows that there is an outbreak of
a disease to which she is susceptible in a particular school, the plaintiff
may not be able to recover if she chooses to spend time in that school
without taking any precautions to protect herself.
IX. CONCLUSION
Parents have the right under current state and federal law to choose
not to immunize their children. Their choice to exercise this right
should not expose them to tort liability. However, their choice, and the
constitutional and privacy rights implicated by the choice, do not
absolve them of their duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent causing
harm to others. Allowing those who have been infected by unvaccinated
children to pursue tort claims merely recognizes this duty. While courts
have not addressed tort claims or duties in this precise context, holdings
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in other cases involving negligent transmission of contagious diseases
support the conclusion that public policy favors tort liability. It
promotes the compelling state interest in preventing the spread of
disease without unduly infringing on the right of parents to direct the
care and upbringing of their children. For these reasons, tort liability
should be available against parents who choose not to immunize their
children and who fail to use due care to prevent those children from
contracting harmful diseases and infecting others.
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APPENDIX A198
Institution

Age

Vaccine

Less than
2 months
2–3
months

None

4–5
months

6–14
months
Child care
center,
day nursery,
nursery
school,
family day
care home,
development
center

15–17
months

18 months
to 5 years

Total Doses Received

Polio1

1 dose

DTP

1 dose

Hib

1 dose

Hepatitis B

1 dose

1

2 doses
2 doses

Polio
DTP, or
combination of DTP
and diphtheriatetanus toxoids
Hib

2 doses

Hepatitis B

2 doses

1

Polio
DTP, or
combination of DTP
and diphtheriatetanus toxoids
Hib

2 doses
3 doses

Hepatitis B

2 doses

Polio1
DTP, or
combination of DTP
and diphtheriatetanus toxoids
Measles, rubella,
and mumps
Hib
Hepatitis B

3 doses
3 doses

2 doses

1 dose of each separately or
combined on or after the 1st birthday
1 dose on or after the 1st birthday
2 doses

Polio1
DTP, or
combination of DTP
and diphtheriatetanus toxoids
Measles, rubella,
and mumps
Hib3
Hepatitis B2

3 doses
4 doses

Varicella

1 dose

1 dose of each separately or
combined on or after the 1st birthday
1 dose on or after the 1st birthday
3 doses

198. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 6020, tbl. 1.
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Elementary
school at
kindergarten
level and
above

Elementary
school,
secondary
school

4–6 years

Polio1

Hepatitis B2

4 doses, except that a total of 3
doses is acceptable if at least one
dose was given on or after the 4th
birthday
5 doses, except that a total of 4
doses is acceptable if at least one
dose was given on or after the 4th
birthday
1 dose of each, separately or
combined, on or after the 1st
birthday. Pupils entering a
kindergarten (or first grade
kindergarten skipped) are required
to have 2 doses of measlescontaining vaccine, both given on or
after the first birthday
3 doses

Varicella

1 dose

DTP, or
combination of DTP
and diphtheriatetanus toxoids
Measles, rubella,
and mumps

7–17
years

Polio

1

Diphtheria and
tetanus toxoids and
pertussis vaccine
given as DTP, DT,
Td, or Tdap
Measles and rubella
(mumps not
required)
Varicella5

1

2

143

Seventh
Grade

Any

Tdap6,7
Measles4

Eighth
through
Twelfth
Grades8
Any

Any pupil
under 18
years

Tdap6,7

4 doses, except that a total of 3
doses is acceptable if at least one
dose was given on or after the 2nd
birthday
At least 3 doses. One more dose is
required if the last dose was given
before the 2nd birthday
1 dose of each, separately or
combined, on or after the 1st
birthday. (See below for additional
requirements for 7th grade
enrollment, effective 7/1/99.)
1 dose aged 7 through 12 years for
students not admitted to California
schools before July 1, 2001. 2
doses for students aged 13 through
17 years not admitted to California
schools before July 1, 2001.
1 dose on or after the 7th birthday
2 doses of measles-containing
vaccine, both given on or after the
first birthday.
1 dose on or after the 7th birthday

18 years
None
ad [sic]
older
Oral polio vaccine (OPV) or inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) or any combination of these
vaccines is acceptable.
Applies only to children entering kindergarten level (or as first grade level if kindergarten
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skipped) or below on or after August 1, 1997. Applies only to children entering at
kindergarten level (or at first grade level if kindergarten skipped) or below on or after
August 1, 1997.
Required only for children who have not reached the age of 4 years 6 months.
Applies only to children (of any age) entering or advancing to the seventh grade on or after
July 1, 1999.
Children admitted to California schools at the Kindergarten level or above before July 1,
2001 are exempt from this requirement.
Pupils must have received at least one does of Tdap prior to admission or advancement
into the 7th through 12th grades.
If DTP was given on or after age 7 years instead of Tdap, this dose may also be counted as
a valid dose for this requirement.
This requirement is effective July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012.
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